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1Human Embryonic Stem Cells and Patent Law in the EU and China: -
Convergence in Standards Through Divergence in Institutions
Abstract
While socio-cultural and historical differences in the EU Member States and China have
resulted in two distinct regimes for human embryonic stem cell research, with the EU
considered somewhat conservative and China significantly liberal in approach, the laws
governing patenting of innovations derived from stem cell research in both legal regimes
appear to be remarkably similar. How is it that two divergent systems have nevertheless
converged on a restrictive approach to patenting in this field of research? This paper will
demonstrate the way in which different institutional pressures and objectives have resulted in
similar practices: - while deliberative decision-making within the context of representative
liberal democracy resulted in the EU placing morality-based limitations on economically-
driven hESC patenting, China’s elite-driven processes within the context of ‘authoritarian
deliberation’ instead adopted morality-based limitations both as an indicator of
demonstrating standards of best practice as a means of encouraging research and
investment, and as the result of institutional learning. Therefore, despite different
institutional designs and policy-making approaches, the EU and China have converged on
remarkably similar hESC patent regimes.
Keywords: - patents, stem-cells, China, EU, institutions, biotechnology, bioethics
Introduction
Human embryonic stem cell (hereafter hESC) research is considered as having thepotential to revolutionise medical science. However, hESC-related research is often an areaof contestation, due to the potential destruction of the human embryo as a result. The EUand China are regions with distinct religious, historical and social perspectives that directlyimpact upon official views of the status of the embryo and the acceptability of researchinvolving human embryos. Nevertheless, it would appear that despite these significantdifferences, the patenting regimes for inventions resulting from hESC-related researchhave converged, rather than diverging as may be expected. The purpose of this paper is to
2explore this phenomenon further, demonstrating how a combination of divergent socio-cultural factors and institutional pressures has actually resulted in two patent systems thatshare similar traits when considering the patenting of biotechnological inventions. Thepaper will begin with an overview of stem cell research in the EU and China, identifying keysocio-cultural concepts that have contributed to the establishment of the position of theembryo in each system, and the resultant frameworks for hESC research, before enteringinto a comparison of the patent regimes for biotechnological inventions in the EU andChina. This comparison will demonstrate that despite being separately achieved in timeand space, the principles for the patenting of hESC-derived inventions are very similar,despite significant differences regarding the ‘moral status’ of an embryo in eachjurisdiction. Finally, the paper will then demonstrate how the similarities found in the twosystems can be understood in terms of ‘institutional path-dependence’, in which decisionsbeing made through very different processes with different underlying ‘logics ofappropriateness’ nevertheless arrived at similar results. Whereas in the EU, the system ofpatenting of hESC-related innovations has been the result of interest group advocacywithin a framework of representative and participatory democracy, the results in Chinahave instead been achieved through expert-governance by the identification of bestpractices through a process of ‘authoritatian deliberation’. In order to provide legitimacyto biomedical research conducted in China, as well as to encourage both investment andrepatriation of biomedical experts, China has sought to demonstrate compliance with‘Western’ standards of best practice in its biotechnology patenting regime.
Stem cell research in the EU and China
In order to more effectively discuss the patentability of hESC-related research in the EUand China, this section of the article will provide a brief definition of this form of stem cellresearch and an overview of these forms of research in the two regions. It must be statedat the outset that it would not be correct to refer to one general approach to stem cell
research in the EU (as opposed to the harmonising legislation laying down therequirements for the patenting of biotechnological inventions), as no harmonised regimeexists, and to describe a ‘European’ approach would neither be nuanced nor correct. Afterdiscussing the regimes, this section will then seek to explain divergences in approachbetween the regions based on differing constructions of the moral status of the human
3embryo, in order to apply this understanding to the patentability requirements forbiotechnological inventions.
Human embryonic stem cells are cells that are pluripotent, which means they have thepotential to develop into different types of specialised cell or tissue1. These cells are seenas particularly useful in medical research, due to their abilities of self-renewal and todevelop into any type of cell found in the human body2. Salter argues that ‘it is the promiseof the scientists engaged in the HESC field that their work will lead to therapies capable ofdealing with one of the major problems of modern medicine: irreversible organ and tissuefailure’3. Stem cells are therefore seen as having the potential to revolutionise the field of‘regenerative’ medicine, allowing for damaged organs to be regrown or repaired, ratherthan individuals waiting for kidney transplants or undergoing complicated, time-consuming and unpleasant dialysis treatments, for example. Similarly, stem cells havebeen indicated as a potential treatment for degenerative neurological conditions such asAlzheimer’s or Parkinson’s disease. For this reason, hESC-related research is perceived asbeing of considerable scientific and economic importance4. Yet despite this, researchinvolving the use of hESCs is seen as politically controversial, particularly as in the processof manipulation and extraction of hESCs the embryo itself is destroyed. One branch of thiscontroversy relates to the issue of human cloning, which, while interesting, thoughtprovoking and worthy of debate, is ultimately outside the remit of this paper5. The otherbranch relates to the moral status of the embryo that is used in this research. According toNeal (née Ford), embryos exist as liminal entities, at the boundary between the categoriesof human and not human (or, rather lacking in identifiable human qualities) – entitiescapable of life, but not yet recognisable as such6. This complex and contentious positionhas meant that different regions and countries have regulated the use of hESCs in medical
1 Rosario M Isasi and others, ‘Legal and Ethical Approaches to Stem Cell and Cloning Research: A ComparativeAnalysis of Policies in Latin America, Asia, and Africa’ (2004) 32 The Journal of Law, Medicine & Ethics 626,628.2 Ibid3 Brian Salter, ‘Global Politics of Human Embryonic Stem Cell Science, The’ (2007) 13 Global Governance 277,279.4 Ibid5 However, for more on these issues, see Isasi and others (n 1) 626–640; Marie Fox, ‘Legislating InterspeciesEmbryos’ in Stephen W Smith and Ronan Deazley (eds), The Legal, Medical and Cultural Regulation of the
Body (Ashgate 2009) 95–99.6 Mary Ford, ‘Nothing and Not-Nothing: Law’s Ambivalent Response to Transformation and Transgression atthe Beginning of Life’ in Stephen W Smith and Ronan Deazley (eds), The Legal, Medical and Cultural
Regulation of the Body (Ashgate 2009) 21–22.
4research differently. While it would be incorrect to state that the Member States of the EUhave taken a common position on their use, it can be stated that the majority of EU MemberStates regulate the use of hESCs conservatively, with the exception of the UK, Sweden andBelgium, which have taken more liberal approaches7. The UK, for example, specificallyallows for the creation of embryos specifically for research purposes, and is the onlycountry in the EU to do so8. The Netherlands, in comparison, does not allow for thecreation of embryos for research purposes, but ‘leftover’ embryos from fertility treatmentsmay be used for research9. Germany and France, at the opposite end of the spectrum, takevery strict and conservative approaches to the use of hESCs in medical research, andGermany in particular prohibits all instrumental uses of the embryo and forbids thecreation of embryos for research10. China, particularly in light of approaches in Europe, isconsidered to have one of the most liberal and permissive regimes for stem cell research inthe world11. China permits research on human embryos for a maximum period of 14 days,and allows for the sourcing of embryos from, for example, ‘leftover’ embryos after IVFtreatment, the use of foetal cells subsequent to the performance of an abortion, and germcells voluntarily donated12. Why then, given the potential uses for hESCs, is their use sovaried in different states?
The moral status of the human embryo, and by extension, stem cell research using thisbiological material, is socially constructed. Social constructivism is a theoreticalframework that maintains that ‘people do one thing and not another due to the presence ofcertain ‘social constructs’: ideas, beliefs, norms, identities or some other interpretive filterthrough which people perceive the world’13. Through better understanding these norms,ideas or beliefs through which decision-making occurs, we are better able to understand
7 Mette N Svendsen and Lene Koch, ‘Unpacking the “Spare Embryo” Facilitating Stem Cell Research in a MoralLandscape’ (2008) 38 Social Studies of Science 93, 93.8 Samantha Halliday, ‘A Comparative Approach To The Regulation Of Human Embryonic Stem Cell ResearchIn Europe’ (2004) 12 Medical Law Review 40, 44.9 ibid 55; On the topic of ‘waste’ or ‘leftover’ embryos, see Charis Cussins, ‘Ontological Choreography: Agencythrough Objectification in Infertility Clinics’ (1996) 26 Social Studies of Science 575, 575–610.10 Halliday (n 8) 57.11 Isasi and others (n 1) 633; Aaron D Levine, ‘Science Policy and the Geographic Preferences of Stem CellScientists: Understanding the Appeal of China and Singapore’ (2010) 29 New Genetics and Society 187, 192;Kerstin Klein, ‘Illiberal Biopolitics and “Embryonic Life”: The Governance of Human Embryonic Stem CellResearch in China’ in Jon Yorke (ed), The Right to Life and the Value of Life (Ashgate 2010) 400.12 Isasi and others (n 1) 634.13 Craig Parsons, ‘Constructivism and Interpretive Theory’ in David Marsh and Gerry Stoker (eds), Theory and
Methods in Political Science (3rd edition edition, Palgrave Macmillan 2010) 80.
5how or why institutional actors take the particular policy decisions they do. As Hay argues,change occurs within institutions ‘in the context which is structured (not least byinstitutions and ideas about institutions) in constantly changing ways which facilitatecertain forms of intervention whilst militating against others’14. Hay states that taking aconstructivist institutional perspective allows us to see how ‘ideas’ inform the developmentof institutions and their approaches to issues, including their political and normativeconstraints15. In other words, the dominant ideas and beliefs within a social and/orcultural area will have an impact on what is and is not possible within that area’s politicaland legal institutions, in what is known as ‘institutional path-dependency’16. Salter andSalter state that ‘no two societies have the same cultural values, though there will beoverlap and similarities’17. ‘Morality’, a concept that can be categorised as a normativeconstruct, is an example of an idea that can have an impact on institutional structures andthe policy decisions of institutional actors, be they governmental executives or thejudiciary.
Medical research, and indeed, discussions concerning morality and ethics in medicalresearch in the EU take place within the context of Western liberal democracy18. Withinthis framework, ‘the freedom of individuals is regarded as a critical yardstick forgovernmental action’19. With this in mind, Blackford argues that in liberal democracies,individual behaviour should only be restrained when that behaviour results in direct harmto another20. In the EU, the status of the human embryo has been influenced by bothreligious and secular beliefs, and the exchange of views that has fed into the policy andlegal processes. Religious arguments based in Christian, but particularly Roman Catholicdoctrine, see life as beginning with conception. A human embryo, according to the Vatican,is considered human life, and that the ‘fact that the process of in vitro fertilization veryfrequently involves the deliberate destruction of embryos […we must reiterate] the sacred
14 Colin Hay, ‘Constructivist Institutionalism’ in RAW Rhodes, Sarah A Binder and Bert A Rockman (eds), The
Oxford Handbook of Political Institutions (OUP Oxford 2006) 65.15 Ibid16 Ibid17 Brian Salter and Charlotte Salter, ‘Bioethical Ambition, Political Opportunity and the European Governanceof Patenting: The Case of Human Embryonic Stem Cell Science’ (2013) 98 Social Science & Medicine 286, 287.18 Benjamin Farrand, ‘Conceptualising Conscientious Objection as Resistance’ [2014] Journal of Medical Lawand Ethics 69, 75.19 Thomas Lemke, Foucault, Governmentality, and Critique (Paradigm 2011) 15.20 See Russell Blackford, Humanity Enhanced: Genetic Choice and the Challenge for Liberal Democracies (MITPress 2014) 15–30 in particular for the application of the harm principle to genetic enhancement.
6and inviolable character of every human life from its conception until its natural end’21.Indeed, secular views in Europe also focus on the inviolability of the embryo as a form ofhuman life, associated with conceptions of dignity22. Authors in this vein point towards theatrocities of the Second World War as a turning point in the way that human life isconsidered in Europe, with the concept of humanity imbuing the individual with an innatesense of dignity worthy of respect, and from which rights derive their source23. In hispowerful work The Future of Human Nature, Habermas argues that the increased usage ofthe human embryo for scientific research ‘instrumentalises’ life, and constitutes an affrontto dignity; there is a potential risk that ‘with research involving the destruction of humanembryos, a practice will come to prevail for which the protection of human life is secondaryto “other ends”, even if these other ends consisted in nothing more than the prospect ofdeveloping high ranking collective goods’24. In other words, arguments against hESCresearch centred on dignity are concerned that ‘life’ may increasingly be regarded as justanother means to an end, rather than having its own intrinsic value. Another concern iswith the commodification of the individual, in addition to an instrumentalisation of theindividual, in which the human becomes a business asset, and life into ‘value’ of aneconomic nature25. Yet arguments also exist in favour of hESC research in Europe – forexample, the above mentioned statements concerning the potential value of this researchfor the treatment of those currently suffering from serious and degenerative conditions. Acounter argument was made by embryo researcher Johnson, who sought to freeresearchers from the ‘tyranny of the embryo’, allowing for useful medical research to bepossible26. Others such as Savulescu have argued that if we ascribe these characteristics tothe human embryo because of its potential to develop into a reasoning, thinking and feelinghuman being, then we would also have to ascribe the same moral status to potentiallytrillions of cells that share this potential27. The development and contestation of theposition of the human embryo in the Western liberal democracy tradition can be
21 Lavada WC, Congregation of the Doctrine of the Faith, ‘Instruction Dignitas Personae on Certain BioethicalQuestions’, Rome, 8 September 200822 Ford (n 6) 29.23 See for example Jürgen Habermas, ‘The Concept of Human Dignity and the Realistic Utopia of HumanRights’ (2010) 41 Metaphilosophy 464, 66; Halliday (n 8) 57.24 Jürgen Habermas, The Future of Human Nature (Polity Press 2003) 71.25 Klein (n 11) 403.26 See John Gillott, ‘The Changing Governance of Embryo Research?’ (2013) 32 New Genetics and Society 190,194.27 See Julian Savulescu, ‘Should We Clone Human Beings? Cloning as a Source of Tissue for Transplantation’(1999) 25 Journal of Medical Ethics 87, 87–95.
7considered as the result of participative deliberation, with interaction between policymakers, scientific researchers, and activist organisations, both in favour of and againsthESC research, based on the belief that a plurality of views is important in both policymaking and legislating28.
In China, we also see the influence of cultural norms upon the understanding of the humanembryo, and what may be permissible in patenting. In comparison to ideals represented bysecular humanism and Christian conceptualisations of life, Chinese conceptualisations havedifferent sources. According to Sleeboom-Faulkner, Confucianism is one school of thoughtthat has influenced understanding of the human embryo in China29. While acknowledgingthat Confucianism does not represent a unified school of philosophical thought, Zhen Cai, ina commentary reproduced in Degeling et al., argues that from the perspective of Mencius’Confucianism, ‘being human’ is about the formation of societal relationships, rather thanbeing a universal quality or characteristic30. Confucianism in the Mencius tradition doesnot associate the ‘human’ with innate qualities, such as the possession of a soul, or beingable to experience emotions or suffering, but with socialisation, and the forming of bondswith family and society31. Human embryos, being biological matter composed of humancells, are ultimately not considered as ‘human life’ in such a way that research involvinghESC, and the subsequent patenting of those inventions, would necessarily be consideredimmoral 32 . A Chinese bioethicist discussed in Sleeboom-Faulkner reiterates thisunderstanding, arguing that ‘as embryos […] are not social human beings but biologicalhuman beings […] spare embryos after in vitro fertilisation (IVF) can be used in research’33.Tsai assumes a more moderate position, instead stating that from a Mencius Confucianperspective, the approach to the status of the human embryo is more ‘gradualist’ – while itmay have value, it possesses less value than the later developed foetus, child or adulthuman, particularly insofar as the use of the stem cells derived from that embryo may treat
28 Ibid, p. 195-19629 Margaret Sleeboom-Faulkner, Global Morality and Life Science Practices in Asia: Assemblages of Life(Palgrave Macmillan 2014) 120.30 Chris Degeling, Rob Irvine and Ian Kerridge, ‘Faith-Based Perspectives on the Use of Chimeric Organismsfor Medical Research’ (2014) 23 Transgenic Research 265, 271.31 Ibid32 Ibid33 Sleeboom-Faulkner (n 29) 120.
8sufferers of debilitating conditions in those children or adults, to whom we owe a greaterrespect and care as a result of strongly established social ties34.
Interestingly, even amongst Chinese bioethicist resources consulted by Sleeboom-Faulknerwhere Confucianism was not part of the theoretical frame for discussions of hESC-relatedresearch, discussions relating to pre-birth attachment to life and trade in embryos were‘mainly defined as problems belonging to foreign, Western, feminist or Christian worlds’35.Klein states that in China, the ‘One Child’ policy means that successful IVF treatment leaves‘leftover’ embryos as their use for the conception of additional children is prohibited36. IVFpatients can then either choose to have the leftover embryos disposed of as waste, ordonated for medical research, such as their use for the derivation of stem cells37. Accordingto Salter, it is ‘commonly supposed […] that the population, accustomed as it is to statepopulation control […] places little value on the human embryo’38. While Salter39 and NieJing-Bao40 consider that such an assumption is not necessarily representative of thefeelings of individuals on the topic, Salter nevertheless states that ‘the politicalmanifestation of such cultural attitudes is limited by the absence of formal mechanisms forthe public discussion of scientific advance and most debate takes place in the confinedprofessional realms of scientists and bioethicists’41 (which will be returned to whendiscussing institutional design and its impact upon patent regimes). While Sleeboom-Faulkner states that there is an active debate on the moral status of the human embryowithin this context, there is little consensus, with bioethicists’ views ranging from theembryo being considered as constituting precious life, through to them having little-to-nointrinsic worth; ‘official policies seem to support the latter fully, and the formerindirectly’42. Nevertheless, what debate exists appears contradictory, and discoursesconcerning the status of embryos limited to an elite body of professionals, which as will be
34 DFC Tsai, ‘Human Embryonic Stem Cell Research Debates: A Confucian Argument’ (2005) 31 Journal ofMedical Ethics 635, 639.35 Sleeboom-Faulkner (n 29) 120.36 Klein (n 11) 412.37 Ibid, p. 41338 Brian Salter, ‘Governing Stem Cell Science in China and India: Emerging Economies and the Global Politicsof Innovation’ (2008) 27 New Genetics and Society 145, 151–152.39 Ibid40 See in particular Nie Jing-Bao, Behind the Silence: Chinese Voices on Abortion (Rowman & LittlefieldPublishers 2005) for a sometimes harrowing account of the personal and social impact of the One Child policyon women.41 Salter (n 38) 152.42 Sleeboom-Faulkner (n 29) 121.
9expanded upon in the fourth section of this article, has significant implications for theinstitutional approaches to the patenting of inventions resulting from hESC-relatedresearch.
Biotechnological patents in comparative perspective – innovation for economic
development
Despite considerable differences in approach to the issue of medical research involvinghESC, the approach to biotechnology-related patents in the EU and China demonstrate asignificant level of commonality, particularly in terms of the drivers of biotechnologypolicies. In the EU, policy documents published in advance of the adoption of theBiotechnology Directive (which shall be discussed in more detail in the next sub-section)demonstrated the European Commission’s perception that biotechnology was a priorityarea for legal reform in order to pursue economic ends. A 1994 Green Paper43 onbiotechnology stated that biotechnology was acknowledged to be ‘one of the fields offeringthe greatest potential for innovation and growth…a key technology for the futurecompetitive development of the Community’44. In the resultant Action Plan published in1996, the Commission reiterated that there were considerable economic imperatives forspeedy action in the field of biotechnology regulation, so as to ‘maintain the ability forrelevant research in Europe and stimulate the creation of new enterprises and themarketing of results’45. Creating a clear framework for the patenting of biotechnologicalinventions, therefore, was considered vital in improving Europe’s innovationenvironment46. Schneider argues that this understanding of biotechnology as beingessential for economic growth had been developing since the 1980s in the EuropeanCommunity47, an understanding consistent with the drive for increased privatisation,market liberalisation and sector deregulation that had begun with cases such as Cassis de
43 Communication from the Commission of the European Communities, Biotechnology and the White Paperon Growth, Competitiveness and Employment: Preparing the Next Stage, COM(94) 219 final, Brussels01/06/199444 Ibid, p. 145 Commission of the European Communities, The First Action Plan for Innovation in Europe: Innovation forgrowth and employment, COM(96) 589 final, Brussels 20/11/1996, p. 3246 Ibid, p. 1447 Ingrid Schneider, ‘Can Patent Legislation Make a Difference? Bringing Parliaments and Civil Society intoPatent Governance’ in Sebastian Haunss and Kenneth C Shadlen (eds), Politics of intellectual property:
contestation over the ownership, use, and control of knowledge and information (Edward Elgar 2009) 134.
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Dijon48 and continued in the Single European Act and ‘constitutionalisation’ of principles ofcompetition 49. This instrumental view of patent law continues to the time of writing, withrecent policy documents released by the Commission reiterating the importance ofinnovation, and by extension the incentivisation of innovation through patent protection,as a driver for economic growth and development in the EU50.
In China, economic growth is also a driver of patent policies generally, and as regardsbiotechnology specifically. Zhu Chen et al. argue that in China, biotechnology and lifesciences have become an issue of national importance, with President Hu Jintao stating that‘biotechnology is the priority of high-tech industries by which China will try to catch upwith the developed countries’51. This has resulted in the establishment of 24 instituteswith 13 research centres, and an increase in funding for life sciences and biotechnologyfrom 50.92 billion RMB (0.64% of GDP) in 1997 to 184.3 billion RMB in 2004 (1.35% ofGDP)52. Klein states that this investment is seen as a means of ensuring social and economicdevelopment53, with the Chinese Government making clear its desire to develop aninnovation and knowledge-based economy54. Premier Wen Jibao made a statement in2009 that intellectual property protection formed part of this economic strategy; ‘in thenew era, global science and technology competition, as well as economic competition, isprimarily a competition of IP rights. Promoting IP rights therefore promotes and inspiresinnovation’55. As in the EU, patenting and by extension patent protection is seen byChinese policy-makers as a means of ensuring innovation, and by extension economicdevelopment as the result of the manufacturing of marketable products and processes.Indeed, as Wechsler states, China’s approach to patent law ‘demonstrates its determination
48 Case 120/78 Cassis de Dijon [1979] EU:C:1979:42, for more on this topic, see Mark Thatcher, ‘SupranationalNeo-Liberalisation: The EU’s Regulatory Model of Economic Markets’ in Vivien A Schmidt and Mark Thatcher(eds), Resilient Liberalism in Europe’s Political Economy (Cambridge University Press 2013) 177–179.49 Fritz Scharpf, Governing in Europe: Effective and Democratic? (OUP Oxford 1999) 55.50 See, for example, European Commission Communication, A Single Market for Intellectual Property Rights:Boosting creativity and innovation to provide economic growth, high quality jobs and first class products andservices in Europe, COM(2011) 287 final, Brussels 24/05/201151 Zhu Chen and others, ‘Life Sciences and Biotechnology in China’ (2007) 362 Philosophical Transactions ofthe Royal Society of London B: Biological Sciences 947, 951.52 Ibid, p. 95353 Klein (n 11) 399.54 Peter K Yu, ‘Building the Ladder: Three Decades of Development of the Chinese Patent System’ (2013) 5WIPO Journal 1, 12.55 Jibao, speech reproduced at State Intellectual Property Office of the People’s Republic of China, ‘China'sIntellectual Property Protection in 2008’, 27/04/2009 accessible athttp://english.sipo.gov.cn/laws/whitepapers/200904/t20090427_457167.html (accessed 1 February 2015)
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to proactively resort to IP policies as an economic policy tool to promote innovation andeconomic development’56. For both China and the EU, biotechnological inventions wouldappear to play a major part in their respective innovation policies. For this reason, andbefore continuing to analyse the importance of the socially constructed nature of ‘morality’for those patent regimes, it is necessary to consider the patentability requirements forbiotechnological inventions in both regimes in more detail.
Biotechnological invention eligibility requirements in EU law
In the European Union, the European Patent Convention (hereafter EPC)57, a multilateraltreaty that is in force for 38 European states, governs the patenting of inventions. The EPCestablished the European Patent Organisation under Article 4, comprising the EuropeanPatent Office (EPO), which assesses the eligibility of patent applications and grantsEuropean Patents to successful claimants, and the Administrative Council, that oversees thework of the EPO. However, it is important to state that the European Patent Organisation
does not constitute a supranational EU institution, but an international organisation towhich EU Member States are party. The European patent is often referred to asconstituting a ‘bundle of national patents’58, insofar as a patent awarded by the EPO will besubject to national validation by the courts in the contracting states in order to beenforceable in that state. Nevertheless, as stated by Luginbhuel, the situation is actuallymore nuanced, as the patentability requirements used by those national courts are set bythe EPC59. Of particular relevance for this paper is Part II of the EPC, which concerns thesubstance of patent applications. Article 52(1) states that ‘European patents shall begranted for any inventions, in all fields of technology, provided that they are new, involvean inventive step and are susceptible of industrial application’.
56 Andrea Wechsler, ‘Intellectual Property Law in the People’s Republic of China: A Powerful Economic Toolfor Innovation and Development’ (2011) 1 China-EU Law Journal 3, 43.57 Convention on the Grant of European Patents (European Patent Convention, hereafter EPC) of 5 October1973, as revised by the Act revising Article 63 EPC of 17 December 1991 and the Act revising the EPC of29 November 200058 See for example Zofia Zawadska, ‘The Unitary Patent Protection - a Voice in the Discussion from the PolishPerspective’ (2014) 45 International Review of Intellectual Property and Competition Law 383, 386; CeyhunNecati Pehlivan, ‘The Creation of a Single European Patent System: From Dream to (almost) Reality’ (2012)34 European Intellectual Property Review 453, 455.59 Stefan Luginbuehl, European Patent Law: Towards a Uniform Interpretation (Edward Elgar 2011) 1–2.
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How does this apply to biotechnological inventions? The EU has sought to harmonise theapproach of the EU Member States to patenting in this field, with the introduction of theBiotechnology Directive60. This Directive states at Article 1(1) that Member States shouldprotect biotechnological inventions under national patent law, with biological materialbeing defined as ‘means any material containing genetic information and capable ofreproducing itself or being reproduced in a biological system’61. They can be patented solong as they are:
‘inventions which are new, which involve an inventive step and which aresusceptible of industrial application shall be patentable even if they concern aproduct consisting of or containing biological material or a process by means ofwhich biological material is produced, processed or used’62.
Novelty requires that the invention does not constitute part of the ‘state of the art’ at thetime that the application is made63, and as specifically applied to biotechnologicalinventions, Article 3(2) of the Directive, even if the biological material previously occurs innature, if it is isolated from its natural environment or produced by means of a technicalprocess, it can still be patented. Perhaps a better way of referring to this is the distinctionbetween ‘discovery’ and ‘invention’. Article 5(1) states that the human body, or the ‘simplediscovery of one of its elements’, including complete or partial gene sequences, cannotconstitute a patentable invention. Instead, there needs to be demonstration of the isolationof an element of the human body by way of a technical process64, with the industrialapplication ‘of a sequence or a partial sequence of a gene’ made clear in the patentapplication65. Odell-West argues that the ‘isolation and function’ requirement constitutesthe key requirement for patentability under the Directive66, following the Monsanto case67.
60 Directive 98/44/EC on the legal protection of biotechnological inventions (hereafter the BiotechnologyDirective)61 Ibid, Article 2(1)(a)62 Ibid, Article 3(1)63 EPC Article 54(1)64 Biotechnology Directive Article 5(2)65 Ibid Article 5(3)66 Amanda Odell-West, ‘“Gene”-Uinely Patentable? The Distinction in Biotechnology between Discovery andInvention in US and EU Patent Law’ [2011] Intellectual Property Quarterly 304, 305, although for hercriticisms of this approach, see p.321.67 Case C-428/08 Monsanto v Cefetra EU:C:2010:402
13
In the Opinion68 written by Advocate General Mengozzi, it was stated that ‘the isolation of aDNA sequence without any indication of a function constitutes a mere discovery and assuch is not patentable’69. Indeed, Mengozzi continues, it is the ‘indication of a function thatit performs’70 that transforms a mere biological discovery into an invention, reading Article5 in line with Article 9, which states that the patent containing or consisting of geneticinformation material will extend to all material in which ‘product in incorporated and inwhich the genetic information is contained and performs its function’71. Confirming theAdvocate General’s Opinion, the Court of Justice of the European Union (CJEU) reiteratesthat an isolation of a DNA sequence without providing a function for that sequence cannotbe patented72. Whereas Carpenter argues that this decision significantly restricts the scopeof patent protection available for biological inventions in the EU73 and Odell-West the caserepresents a significant development in EU patent law74, Paton and Denoon see the case asone of fact, stressing Monsanto’s lack of function-related information in their patentapplication, and the decision of the CJEU as confirming what was already stated in Articles5 and 9 of the Biotechnology Directive75. At the level of the EPO, the Icos Decision76demonstrates that even where an element already exists in nature, the purification andisolation of that element (in this case, a nucleic acid), could in theory be patented as aninvention rather than a discovery77. Nevertheless, even if an invention, if no function isprovided in the patent application or the nature of the described function is speculativeonly, then the application will fail78. Interestingly, the EPO Guidelines for patentexamination79 draw directly from the Biotechnology Directive for its rules on novelty,inventive step and industrial application for biotechnological inventions, and state that it ‘is
68 Case C-428/08 Monsanto v Cefetra EU:C:2010:12869 Ibid, para.3170 Ibid71 Emphasis added72 Case C-428/08 Monsanto v Cefetra EU:C:2010:402, para.4573 Craig C Carpenter, ‘Seeds of Doubt: The European Court of Justice’s Decision in Monsanto v. Cefetra and theEffect on European Biotechnology Patent Law’ (2010) 44 The International Lawyer 1189, 1189.74 Odell-West (n 66) 320; see also Sven JR Bostyn, ‘A Decade after the Birth of the Biotech Directive: Was ItWorth the Trouble?’ in Emanuela Arezzo and Gustavo Ghidini (eds), Biotechnology and Software Patent Law(Edward Elgar 2011) 233–234.75 Mark Paton and Alex Denoon, ‘The Ramifications of the Advocate General’s Opinion in the Oliver BrüstleCase’ (2011) 33 European Intellectual Property Review 590, 593.76 Icos Decision [2002] OJEPO 29377 Ibid, p. 30778 Ibid, p. 30479 Guidelines for Examination in the European Patent Office, November 2014
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to be used as a supplementary means of interpretation’80. For this reason, it may beconcluded that biotechnological inventions may, at least in theory, be patentable in the EU.However, as will be demonstrated in section 3.3 of this paper, conceptualisations ofmorality may play a part in preventing the patenting of otherwise eligible inventions.
Biotechnological invention eligibility requirements in Chinese law
China, according to Qiongdi Chen81, has formal patentability requirements that closelyresemble those of the EPC. This is not particularly surprising – as Ping-Hsun Chen states,many of the early reforms to Chinese patent law were as a response to externalpressures82. In particular, China’s accession to the World Trade Organisation in 2001necessitated the ratification of the Agreement on Trade Related Aspects of IntellectualProperty Rights (TRIPS), and by extension the requirements of the Paris Convention on theProtection of Industrial Property. During the negotiations under the auspices of theUruguay Round, China along with India tried to mediate between the interests ofdevelopment in developing economies and the desire to ensure high levels of protectionand substantive harmonisation in the industrialised economies, albeit unsuccessfully83.Whereas the Patent Law (1984) was significantly restrictive in its requirements forpatentability, specifically excluding pharmaceutical products and plant and animalvarieties (albeit allowing for patenting of the processes)84, later iterations of the lawrepresented a liberalisation of the eligibility requirements in line with internationalrequirements85, with the exclusion of pharmaceutical products from patent protection notbeing present in the Patent Law (2008)86. According to Handong Wu, this was both the
80 Ibid, Part G-Chapter II-16 at para.5.281 Qiongdi Chen, ‘Patent Biotechnology Invention in China’ (2010) 32 European Intellectual Property Review9, 10.82 Ping-Hsun Chen, ‘China as a Technology Exporter: A Question Mark after the Third Amendment of theChina Patent Law in 2009’ (2012) 34 European Intellectual Property Review 853, 853.83 Joseph Straus and Nina-Sophie Klunker, ‘Harmonisation of International Patent Law’ (2007) 38International Review of Intellectual Property and Competition Law 907, 911–912.84 Patent Law of the People’s Republic of China (1984) Article 2585 Chen (n 81) 9; see also Xiang Yu, ‘The Impact of the Amendments of the Chinese Patent System on theTechnological and Economic Progress in China’ in Wolrad Prinz zu Waldeck und Pyrmont and others (eds),
Patents and Technological Progress in a Globalized World (Springer 2009) 877.86 Patent Law of the People’s Republic of China (2008) Article 25
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result of internal in addition to external pressures – in particular, to stimulate the domesticeconomy as well as develop science and technology-related development87.
In theory, biotechnological inventions can be patented under the 2008 Act, with Article 26stating that for ‘invention-creation accomplished by relying on genetic resources, theapplicant shall, in the patent application documents, indicate the direct and original sourceof the genetic resources’. In general, however, a patent is subject to eligibility requirementsunder Article 22 that require the invention to be ‘novel, creative and of practical use’ –while the wording of this Article is significantly different to that of the EPC Article 52(1),the subsequent explanation in Article 22 helps to demonstrate the similarity in technicalrequirements. Novelty means that the invention is ‘not an existing technology’, creativitythat the invention ‘possesses prominent substantive features and indicates remarkableadvancements’ (indicating similarity with the ‘inventive step’ requirement under the EPC),and practical use that the invention ‘can be used for production or be utilized, and mayproduce positive results’ (i.e., that is possesses an industrial application). Furthermore,Article 22 states that ‘scientific discoveries’ are not patentable, indicating that the Chineseapproach closely mirrors that of the EU under the EPC88.
In determining the eligibility of biotechnological inventions for patent protection in China,it is particularly useful to refer to the English-language translation of the 2010 Guidelineson the Examination of Patents89. However, it must be explicitly stated that the Guidelinesare considered in China as an agency manual, intended to assist the Chinese patent officialsof the State Intellectual Property Office (SIPO) in assessing applications, and do not haveany legally binding force90. For this reason, any patent granted that appears to be inconflict with the Guidelines will not be considered invalid91. By way of explanation, theGuidelines state that ‘scientific discoveries’ refers to ‘revelations of substances,phenomena, transformation processes and their features and laws, which objectively exist
87 Handong Wu, ‘One Hundred Years of Progress: The Development of the Intellectual Property System inChina’ (2009) 1 WIPO Journal 117, 119.88 An assessment in line with that of Li Xiang and others, ‘A Comparative Analysis of the Inventive StepStandard in the EPO, SIPO and USPTO’ (2013) 8 Journal of Intellectual Property Law & Practice 539, 540.89 Guidelines of 1 February 2010, on Examination of Patents (promulgated by Order No. 55 of the StateIntellectual Property Office, accessible at http://www.wipo.int/wipolex/en/details.jsp?id=6511 Accessed 1February 201590 Huan Zhu, ‘A Comparative Study on Human Embryonic Stem Cell’s Patent-Eligibility in the United States,the European Patent Organization and China’ [2012] ExpressO 1, 19.91 Ibid
16
in the nature’92. Expanding upon the Patent Law (2008), the Guidelines provide for theconsideration of biotechnological inventions, including a definition of biological materialalmost identical to that found in the Biotechnology Directive, namely ‘any materialcontaining genetic information and capable of reproducing itself or being reproduced in abiological system, such as a gene, plasmid, microorganism…and so on’93. Furthermore, theGuidelines state that a gene or DNA fragment may be patentable where it and the processto obtain it are ‘isolated or extracted for the first time from the nature, its base sequence isunknown in the prior art and can definitely be characterised, and it can be exploitedindustrially’94. It would appear, then, that on the face of it, the basic eligibilityrequirements for biotechnological patents are, if not identical, at least very similar in boththe EU and China. Nevertheless, this may not be the case when assessing barriers topatenting on the basis of morality, as will be discussed in the next subsection.
What cannot be patented – the ordre public and public morality
While in principle biotechnological inventions may be patented in the EU and China, evenwhere those inventions may contain biological material. However, in both systems, thegranting of a patent will be subject to consideration of the morality of the invention. In theEU, the Biotechnology Directive states at Article 6(1) that inventions will not be grantedpatent protection where their commercial exploitation would be considered contrary to
ordre public or morality. In particular, Article 6(2) states that any processes for the cloningof human beings, or the use of human embryos for industrial or commercial purposes, willalso be deemed ineligible for patent protection. Preamble paragraph 42 states, however,that ‘whereas in any case such exclusion does not affect inventions for therapeutic ordiagnostic purposes which are applied to the human embryo and are useful to it’. Thiswould appear to indicate that whereas the patenting of the human embryo itself, orprocesses involving the use of human embryos may not be patentable, this does not in itselfmean that patents involving hESC-related research are also prohibited under Article 6. Aswith Article 5 of the Directive, the EPO has also incorporated Article 6 into its own rules95,
92 Guidelines at p. 13493 Ibid, p.34694 Ibid, p.34795 See Paul Torremans, ‘Patentability of Human Stem Cells or Synthetic Biology Based Inventions’ in EmanuelaArezzo and Gustavo Ghidini (eds), Biotechnology and Software Patent Law (Edward Elgar 2011) 298.
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with Article 53(a) of the EPC stating that ‘inventions the commercial exploitation of whichwould be contrary to "ordre public" or morality’ cannot be patented. The application ofthis principle to hESC-research related inventions was undertaken in the WARF case heardbefore the EPO’s Enlarged Board of Appeal96. In this case, the Wisconsin Alumni ResearchFoundation, or WARF, sought a patent for a cell culture comprising embryonic stem cellsthat could be grown in vitro. The appellants claimed that this was an exciting andpromising invention97, that the prior method of extraction of stem cells from a pre-14 dayembryo does not constitute ‘in any real sense performing an industrial or commercialact’98, and that if Article 6 of the Directive intended to ‘exclude from patentability productsderived from human embryos it would have explicitly said so’99. The appellantsmaintained that the concern was with the commercialisation of embryos themselves,rather than tissues or cells derived from embryos100. Nevertheless, the Board found thatthe invention was not patentable. The stem cells derived in the technique described in thepatent application could not occur without the destruction of the embryo itself, meaningthat the use of the embryo involved destruction constituted ‘an integral and essential partof the industrial or commercial exploitation of the claimed invention’101. Reference wasspecifically made to preamble paragraph 42 of the Biotechnology Directive, in determiningthat patentability was only possible where the invention was of therapeutic or diagnosticbenefit to the embryo itself, which could not be the case if the embryo was destroyed102.
While Torremans explicitly states (and has been discussed above) that there is no suchthing as a common standard of morality in the EU that can be simply used in assessingpatent claims103, the CJEU nevertheless appears to have created something of a morality‘threshold’ that patent claims involving hESCs must meet in order to be successful. Brüstle
v Greenpeace104 concerned a German patent held by Brüstle for the production of isolatedand purified neural precursor cells obtained from hESCs for use in treating neural
96 G 002/06 Use of embryos/WARF [2009] OJEPO 5 30697 Ibid, p. 31098 Ibid, p. 31299 Ibid, p. 313100 Ibid101 Ibid, p.328102 Ibid103 Torremans (n 95) 298; see also Enrico Bonadio, ‘Biotech Patents and Morality after Brustle’ (2012) 34European Intellectual Property Review 433, 438–440.104 C-34/10 Brüstle v Greenpeace EU:C:2011:669
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defects105. In Advocate General Bot’s Opinion106, the requirements of patentability shouldbe consistent with the Directive with a ‘view to harmonisation which integrates ethicalconsiderations so as to prevent the economic functioning of the market giving rise tocompetition at the cost of sacrificing the fundamental values of the Union’107. Bot howeverstated that taking a position on the definition of the human embryo based in philosophicalor religious conceptualisations would be impossible to formulate in a way acceptable toeveryone108, and would therefore take a scientific approach, and classified embryos as thetotipotent cells with the capacity to develop into a human being109. Pluripotent cells incomparison, which formed the basis of the patent, cannot develop individually into ahuman being, and in Bot’s opinion could not be considered as an embryo in itself110, withthe result that hESCs would be considered as ‘as elements isolated from the humanbody’111, and subsequently not necessarily excluded from enjoying patent protection.However, as with the WARF decision, the cells in the patent claim could only be obtainedthrough the destruction of the embryo, then regardless of whether that claim did not makereference to the use of human embryos, the invention cannot be patented as it is contraryto the ordre public112. The CJEU concurred with the Opinion, stating that hESC-relatedinventions could not be patented where the material covered under the patent wasextracted through the destruction of the embryo113. This decision caused considerableconsternation on the part of certain academics, both with regard to what has been seen as adeliberate sidestepping of deliberation upon moral and philosophical issues 114 ,disagreements regarding the definition of a human embryo used by the CJEU115 and therisk of the EU falling behind its competitors with regard to stem-cell research as a result ofthe restrictions on patentability116.
105 Ibid, para.15106 C-34/10 Brüstle v Greenpeace EU:C:2011:138107 Ibid, para.44108 Ibid, para.82109 Ibid, paras.84-85.110 Ibid, para.98111 Ibid, para.101112 Ibid, para.117113 C-34/10 Brüstle v Greenpeace EU:C:2011:669, paras.47-49114 Shawn HE Harmon and Graham Laurie, ‘Dignity, Plurality and Patentability: The Unfinished Story ofBrustle v Greenpeace’ (2013) 38 European Law Review 92, 97–98; Kathleen Liddell, ‘Immorality and Patents’,
New Frontiers in the Philosophy of Intellectual Property (Cambridge University Press 2012) 167.115 Hubertus Schacht, ‘Commencement or Completion: What Constitutes a “Human Embryo” within the
Meaning of the EU Biotechnology-Directive ?’ (2014) 36 European Intellectual Property Review 66, 71. 116 Charles Brabin, ‘Intellectual Property Law in the Realm of Biology - Striking the Right Balance’ (2014) 36European Intellectual Property Review 687, 691–692.
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However, Brüstle has been followed by the recent ISCO decision117, which has considerablywidened the scope for patenting relating to pluripotent stem cells, mitigating some of theabove-stated criticisms. The CJEU had to determine whether an invention producingpluripotent human stem cell lines from parthenogenetically-activated oocytes could bepatented118. According to Advocate General Villalón119, scientists have discovered ways ofinitiating cell division that does not require an ovum to be fertilised; the unfertilised oocyteis ‘activated’ by a variety of chemical and electrical techniques allowing for the extractionof stem cells (parthenogenesis), but the oocyte cannot develop into a human being120. ForVillalón, this could only mean ‘that unfertilised human ova whose division and furtherdevelopment have been stimulated by parthenogenesis as described by the referring courtare not included in the term “human embryos”’121, with the result that hESCs obtained fromthem does not result in the destruction of human life. For this reason, such inventions arecapable of being patented. In its Decision, the CJEU concurred with Villalón that theinvention would not involve the use of a human embryo, with the caveat that ‘if, in the lightof current scientific knowledge, that ovum does not, in itself, have the inherent capacity ofdeveloping into a human being, this being a matter for the national court to determine’122.It may be concluded therefore that while in principle inventions containing hESCs may bepatented in the EU under the Biotechnology Directive, a particularly restrictive approachhas been taken – if the embryo is destroyed in the process of obtaining that material, itcannot be patented. Alternative means of obtaining such material, such as throughartificial stimulation of a non-fertilised ova that cannot develop into a human being (andthereby does not constitute a human embryo) will be permitted, and the subsequentinvention not excluded from patentability due to being contrary to the ordre public.
We must now turn to consideration of the morality principle in China. It may be concludedthat the patenting of stem cells derived from human embryos would be subject to a much
117 Case C-364/13 International Stem Cell Corporation (ISCO) v Comptroller General of Patents, Designs andTrade Marks EU:C:2014:2451118 Ibid, para.10119 Case C-364/13 International Stem Cell Corporation (ISCO) v Comptroller General of Patents, Designs andTrade Marks EU:C:2014:2104120 Ibid, paras.29-30121 Ibid, para.75122 Case C-364/13 International Stem Cell Corporation (ISCO) v Comptroller General of Patents, Designs andTrade Marks EU:C:2014:2451, para.38
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less restrictive approach, given the more liberal regime for hESC-related research.However, such a finding is not supported upon a reading of the Chinese Patent Act andaccompanying Guidelines. According to Article 5 of the Patent Act, ‘patent rights shall notbe granted for invention-creations that violate the law or social ethics, or harm publicinterests’. According to Li Jiang, the Commission on Legislative Affairs has stated that ‘thesocial morality standard depends on public acceptability’123. As the Guidelines state,‘”social morality” refers to ethical or moral norms and rules generally recognised asjustifiable and acceptable by the public’124. On this basis, the use of human embryos forindustrial or commercial purposes is considered contrary to public morality and notgranted patent rights125. How this has been interpreted in practice is not entirely clear –while Huan Zhu states that methods of producing non-modified pluripotent hESCs arepatentable in practice, contrary to the Guidelines126, Qiongdi Chen argues that theinterpretation of this principle is closely in line with that of the EPO127. This argumentwould appear to be supported by an analysis of patent application appeals performed by LiJiang. In one case, involving the Shanghai Genon Biological Products Company, anapplication was made for an invention that involved mixing a donor nuclear cell and non-mammalian cytoplasm, which would then be stimulated and transplanted into non-humanmammals128. Li Jiang states that the application was rejected by SIPO, and the appealsubsequently rejected by the patent review committee, on the grounds that it was notprecluded that the early embryos that provided the nuclear cells involved in the transfercould not develop into a human being129.
A further development came with an application for a patent by the Regents of theUniversity of California for the use of hESCs for the treatment of spinal cord injuries. Thepatent review committee appears to have concluded that where the use of hESCs reliesupon the destruction of a human embryo, that invention cannot be patented130. This wouldappear to be reflective of the approach taken by the CJEU in the Brüstle and ISCO decisions.
123 Li Jiang, ‘Between Scylla and Charybdis: Patentability and Morality Related to Human Embryonic StemCells’ (2015) 6 Intellectual Property Brief 53, 75.124 Guidelines at p. 131125 Ibid126 Zhu (n 90) 19.127 Chen (n 81) 10.128 Jiang (n 123) 77.129 Ibid, p. 78130 Ibid, p. 80
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Whereas genetic information and material could be patented in principle, includinginformation or material derived from hESC-related research, where that extractioninvolves use resulting in the destruction of an embryo, the invention cannot be patented.Caution must be exercised, however, in interpreting these decisions. As Huan Zhu states,the decisions of the SIPO patent office and its review committees are administrative rulesonly, and as such have no legal force in the courts, and cannot influence the decisions of theSupreme People’s Court or the Standing Committee, which have the final say on thepatentability (or not) of inventions involving the use of hESCs131. Therefore, to concludethat an established and binding precedent has been set on these matters in China would beboth overreaching and premature. Nevertheless, empirical evidence would appear tosuggest that while hESC-related innovations are granted patents in China, this is at acomparatively low level when compared to both the US and EU, with the US beingresponsible for 21% of all stem-cell related patents, the EPO for 14% and China for 2%respectively132. This may be explained by China adopting a more restrictive approach topatenting in this field, which according to Jiang, creates a paradox where human embryoshave low moral status in practical scientific application, but high moral status in patentlaw133. If this is the case, then how may it be explained?
Institutional design and the impact upon legislative development
As discussed in the previous section, in theory at least, biotechnological inventions can bepatented in both the EU and China, and the substance of the eligibility requirementsanalysed thus far is remarkably similar. While it would appear that the moral objectionformalised in law to the patents related to hESC-related research is similar in the EU andChina, these formalistic similarities are somewhat surprising and serve to conceal differingnorms attached to human embryos that are reflective of different socio-cultural andhistorical traditions. How, then, can the similarities in the Biotechnology Directive andsubsequent case law, and the Patent Act and associated Guidelines in China be explained?It is submitted that whereas substantially different institutional pressures have been
131 Zhu (n 90) 22.132 Karl Bergman and Gregory D Graff, ‘The Global Stem Cell Patent Landscape: Implications for EfficientTechnology Transfer and Commercial Development’ (2007) 25 Nature Biotechnology 419, 420 - however, itmust be stated that this study does not specifically distinguish between ‘embyronic’ and ‘adult’ stem cells.133 Jiang (n 123) 81–82.
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exerted in both the EU and the China, these pressures have resulted in a convergence of
patenting regulation, even if the regulation of stem cell research itself divergessubstantially in the two regions.
It is important to consider that decisions taken by law-making bodies are not random orwithout underlying logic. Instead, decision-making exhibits ‘path-dependence’134, in whichinstitutions, namely the rules, norms and ‘standard operating procedures’ of a particularorganisation or state, influence how decisions are made135, which serves to constrain someactions or ways of formulating law, while facilitating others. These ‘rules ofappropriateness’ are then transmitted between actors in a particular institution ororganisation through ‘socialisation [… and…] followed because they are seen as natural,rightful, expected and legitimate’136. As stated in the second section of this article, theregulation of medical technologies in the EU has occurred within the frame and discoursesof Western liberal democracy, hinging upon such concepts as freedom of choice andrepresentative democracy. Within this framework, the European Parliament ostensiblyserves as a body representing the interests of European Union citizens, able in part to takean impartial stance against decision-making in the Commission137, even prior to theestablishment of the ordinary legislative procedure under the Treaty of Lisbon. While itmay be accepted that the participatory element of citizens in the election of the EuropeanParliament is relatively weak, with citizens considering national elections as moreimportant than those at the EU level138, the involvement of citizens in the political and law-making processes, and indeed interest group participation, is nevertheless understoodwithin this framework as legitimate139. Schmidt refers to this involvement as being
134 As coined by Kathleen Thelen and Sven Steinmo, ‘Historical Institutionalism in Comparative Politics’ inSven Steinmo, Kathleen Thelen and Frank Longstreth (eds), Structuring Politics: Historical Institutionalism in
Comparative Analysis (Cambridge University Press 1992) 2.135 See generally Daniel Beland and Robert Henry Cox, ‘Introduction: Ideas and Politics’ in Daniel Beland andRobert Henry Cox (eds), Ideas and Politics in Social Science Research (Oxford University Press 2010).136 James G March and Johan P Olsen, ‘Elaborating the “New Institutionalism”’ in RAW Rhodes, Sarah A Binderand Bert A Rockman (eds), The Oxford Handbook of Political Institutions (OUP 2006) 7.137 Frank Decker, ‘Governance beyond the Nation-State. Reflections on the Democratic Deficit of the EuropeanUnion’ (2002) 9 Journal of European Public Policy 256, 260–261.138 On the nature of European Parliament elections as ‘second order’ elections, see Julie Smith, ‘How EuropeanAre the European Elections?’ in John Gaffney (ed), Political Parties and the European Union (Routledge 1996).139 Sabine Saurugger, ‘Interest Groups and Democracy in the European Union’ (2008) 31 West EuropeanPolitics 1274, 1280–1281; see also Stijn Smismans, ‘European Civil Society: Shaped by Discourses andInstitutional Interests’ (2003) 9 European Law Journal 473.
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government ‘for and with the people’140, in which advocacy coalitions or organised interestgroups can be involved in decision-making through a form of ‘consultative democracy’141.With regard to the negotiation of the Biotechnology Directive, which subsequentlyinfluenced the EPO Guidelines, participatory activism by interest groups helped to shapethe substance of the law. The Biotechnology Directive as originally envisaged was inessence an economic document142, and a first Commission Proposal for a Directivepublished in 1988143 made no mention whatsoever of issues of morality or ethics inbiotechnology research, only laying out the various types of biotechnological invention thatcould be patented. Articles 5 and 6 of the Biotechnology Directive, concerned with thepatenting of living material and inventions contrary to public morality respectively, did notexist in this first Proposal.
However, the fact that such a Directive was being considered, with no concern expressedregarding the possible commodification or private ownership of life forms, mobilising bothsecular and religious groups to engage in lobbying activity at the European Parliament144.Those with an outsider perspective, i.e. those not involved in the drafting and developmentof the legislation, saw the Directive as ignoring serious moral quandaries, with the expertsinvolved in biotechnology-related innovation as ignoring or neglecting socio-culturalconcerns145. Sustained lobbying pressures on the European Parliament by these outsideractivist groups ultimately saw the Proposal rejected in 1995 by the European Parliamenton the 3rd reading, with 240 voting against acceptance of a conciliatory text as opposed to188 in favour146. In the revised Proposal published at the end of 1995147, the Commissionacknowledged the failing of the first Proposal, stating however that it considered it to belargely technical in character;
140 Vivien A Schmidt, ‘The European Union: Democratic Legitimacy in a Regional State?*’ (2004) 42 JCMS:Journal of Common Market Studies 975, 977.141 ibid 985.142 Schneider (n 47) 134.143 Commission Proposal for a Council Directive on the legal protection of biotechnological inventionsCOM(88) 496 final144 Schneider (n 47) 135–137.145 See for example Julia Black, ‘Regulation as Facilitation: Negotiating the Genetic Revolution’ (1998) 61 TheModern Law Review 621, 647–649.146 European Parliament, Minutes of Proceedings of the Sitting of Wednesday, 1 March 1995 [OJ] 95 C 68/12at C 68/16147 Commission Proposal for a European Parliament and Council Directive on the legal protection ofbiotechnological inventions COM(95) 661 final
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‘not that the ethical dimension was ignored but, at that time, it appeared that theexclusion from patentability of inventions the publication or exploitation of whichwould be contrary to public policy or morality […already provided for in nationallegislation and the EPC] met the need to take into account the ethical dimension ofbiotechnological inventions’.148
The new text was a compromise version, incorporating the Articles on excluding livingcreatures from patentability and the clause on the ordre public149. Industry representativesin favour of the earlier draft lobbied intensely for the passing of the new draft of theDirective, alongside campaigners (both independent and financed by actors within thebiotechnology industry) arguing for the morality of biotechnology patents with regard tothe possibility of treating debilitating and/or degenerative conditions150 , with theBiotechnology Directive ultimately being approved by the European Parliament. Thedevelopment of the EU approach to the patenting of hESC-related inventions is of aninstitutional tension between experts and citizens151, in which industry representativesand biotechnology experts framed their arguments in terms of sound academic science,rationality and decrying decisions made on the basis of emotions rather than facts152 andcitizen and activist organisations instead framed the discussion in terms of the need forconsideration of moral issues153. This deliberation between competing viewpoints in aform of deliberative and participative democratic action ultimately led to a compromisebetween these views, in which the economic and scientific drivers of the BiotechnologyDirective remained dominant, and in principle allowing for the patenting of hESC-relatedinnovations, while acknowledging the contested, and indeed contestable nature of aDirective with bioethical implications154. Subsequent jurisprudence then sought tomediate between these competing interests, reinforcing a scientific-rationalist view of theembryo, with a definition based on scientific principles and the distinction made betweenan embryo and its composite cells, while nevertheless reinforcing the destruction of the
148 Ibid, p. 5149 Ibid, p. 14150 Schneider (n 47) 140–141.151 See Susana Borrás, ‘Three Tensions in the Governance of Science and Technology’ in David Levi-Faur (ed),
The Oxford Handbook of Governance (Oxford University Press 2014) 434.152 Steve Emmott, ‘No Patents on Life’ in Brian Tokar (ed), Redesigning Life: The Worldwide Challenge to
Genetic Engineering (Zed Books Ltd 2001) 377.153 Black (n 145) 649.154 Schneider (n 47) 142.
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embryo as an affront to morality, albeit through the use of Article 6 of the BiotechnologyDirective rather than reaffirmation of a more universal principle of dignity. Ultimately, itmay be concluded that the current design of the Biotechnology Directive, and thesubsequent consideration of how, if at all, hESC-related innovations can be patented are theresult of an institutional framework in which citizen and/or interest group participation inthe decision-making process is accepted as a legitimate form of law-making.
As stated in the above sections, by way of comparison, the debate concerning the status ofhuman embryos in China has largely been held amongst professional groups rather thanwith the participation of the general public. Biotechnology patent regulation has thereforebeen an elite-driven process rather than one that has hallmarks of representative orparticipatory democratic action on the part of individual citizens. Again, institutional path-dependence can help to explain this variation; whereas the law-making processes of the EUfunction in such a way as to give legitimacy to the involvement of interest groups, withinthe Chinese system, this type of involvement would not be consistent with its ‘logic ofappropriateness’. Weatherley states that legitimacy of law-making within the one-partystate as led by Mao Zedong was based in a ‘charismatic’ legitimacy based upon hisperception as a revered revolutionary leader155. In the post-1997 era, represented by theleadership of Jiang Zemin (and of particular relevance to patent laws) Hu Jinato, legitimacyhas instead been based in reliance upon ‘institutions and procedures as a means ofaugmenting their political power’156. In particular, the Chinese law-making system can beviewed as one of ‘authoritarian deliberation’157, where political leaders take guidance fromexperts upon strictly limited issues of governance, and which they then rely upon to upholdthe legitimacy of their decisions158. While occasionally involving ordinary citizens, theseprocesses more often include expert committees and think-tanks159. As applied tobiotechnology research, this deliberation in China can most effectively be categorised as aform of ‘expert governance’, in which Ministry of Health and Ministry of Science andTechnology work with technical experts, generally behind closed doors, although it must bestated that as of 2013 this appears to be slowly changing, with plans of the Ministry of
155 Robert Weatherley, Politics in China Since 1949: Legitimizing Authoritarian Rule (Routledge 2007) 7–8.156 ibid 8.157 Baogang He and Mark E Warren, ‘Authoritarian Deliberation: The Deliberative Turn in Chinese PoliticalDevelopment’ (2011) 9 Perspectives on Politics 269.158 ibid 269.159 ibid 283.
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Health’s Ethics Committee to publish its findings as a means of generating debatesregarding bioethics 160 . Nevertheless, with regard to the regulation of stem-celltechnologies, laws governing the patentability of resulting innovations have been an elite-driven process. As Sleeboom-Faulker states, interviews with 60 stem cell scientists inChina indicated that they were opposed to general public engagement and debate on hESC-related research, as they were worried it would turn debate against such research161. Theyinstead believed that their own involvement in the institutionalisation of review boardsand ethical guidelines would help to safeguard against concerns regarding ethics andpublic morality162. In this respect, the means by which biotechnology regulation wasdeveloped in China stands in stark contrast to the more deliberative dimension of thepassing of the Biotechnology Directive in the EU. Yet if this is the case, why do thestandards demonstrated in the Patent Act and Guidelines in China appear so similar tothose of the EU Biotechnology Directive and EPO standards?
It is submitted that this is the result of a combination of internal and external institutionalpressures that have led to Chinese officials consciously adopting the standards of ‘Western’bioethical standards in its biotechnology patent regulations. Internally, Sleeboom-Faulkerindicates that the interviews with stem cell scientists and policy-makers view compliancewith ‘Western’ standards of bioethics with ‘advanced’ practice and ‘good science’163, andthat the use of international standards as a benchmark domestically promote an‘international aura of reliability and exude authority’164. This is related to the interactionbetween internal and external drivers, as these practices and approaches are introducedand promoted by Chinese scholars that have returned to China after experience inuniversities and scientific research institutions in other countries 165 - a form ofinstitutional learning. In this form of institutional learning, the knowledge and experiencedeveloped by researchers and biotechnology experts in other countries becomesinternalised, and then use this knowledge to revise policy positions166. This ‘diaspora’ of
160 Ayo Wahlberg and others, ‘From Global Bioethics to Ethical Governance of Biomedical ResearchCollaborations’ (2013) 98 Social Science & Medicine 293, 296.161 Sleeboom-Faulkner (n 29) 201.162 Ibid163 Ibid, pp. 128-129164 Ibid, p. 197165 Salter (n 38) 149.166 Paul A Sabatier, ‘The Advocacy Coalition Framework: Revisions and Relevance for Europe’ (1998) 5Journal of European Public Policy 98, 104.
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scientists is encouraged to return to China to provide their expertise both in terms ofconducting research and in establishing principles of best practice, in exchange for salariesoften double those of Chinese scientists not trained abroad167 in a form of ‘reverse braindrain’168. With them, they ‘bring back’ internalised standards and guidelines for hESCresearch and patenting, and with it an air of international respectability that feeds intoexpert policy-making processes at home.
Finally, given the desire to become a major player in biotechnology research, an ostensibleadherence to international standards, both in terms of research ethics and the subsequentpatenting of that research serves China’s international objectives as well as its internalones. As already mentioned, developments in Chinese Patent law have in part been aresponse to international legal pressures169. However, compliance with internationalstandards is also motivated by the above-stated economic pressures, where compliance isseen as a signal for foreign investment170 as well as encouraging more stem cell scientists(both Chinese and non-Chinese nationals) to conduct research in China, something that hasbeen considered historically difficult171. Furthermore, as global biomedical research withteams in multiple jurisdictions become more common, adherence to stricter ethicalconduct guidelines often becomes part of the collaborative agreement 172 . Bydemonstrating that Chinese Patent laws are in line with the EPC and EU approach tobiotechnology innovation, including hESC-related inventions, it is intended that this willsend a positive message to potential investors and researchers that China is a responsibleand legitimate hub for biotechnology research. This highlights the fact that although theregulatory standards for patenting of hESC-related inventions has significantly convergedupon similar conceptions of morality, this has been achieved through very differentinstitutional processes, in which law-makers are bound by institutional path-dependenciesthat serve to render actions ‘legitimate’ or ‘illegitimate’ – whereas the EU’s standards weredeveloped through interest group interaction and public engagement within a system ofrepresentative and participatory democracy, the similar standards developed in China
167 Brian Salter, Melinda Cooper and Amanda Dickins, ‘China and the Global Stem Cell Bioeconomy: AnEmerging Political Strategy?’ (2006) 1 Regenerative Medicine 671, 675.168 Levine (n 11) 204.169 Chen (n 82) 853; Yu (n 85) 877.170 Salter (n 38) 155; Weiping Yuan and others, ‘Stem Cell Science On the Rise in China’ (2012) 10 Cell StemCell 12, 13–14.171 Ibid, p. 154172 Wahlberg and others (n 160) 297.
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through expert-led governance based in a tradition of authoritarian deliberation, withpolicies being established as the result of ‘learned’ standards.
Concluding remarks
As this paper has demonstrated, the approaches to hESC-related research vary significantlyeven within the EU, let alone in comparison with China. Despite these substantialdifferences however, with one region ostensibly granting the human embryo high moralstatus and another that officially appears to grant it low social status, the position of theembryo within both systems is treated by their respective patent systems as being of highmoral status, despite the significant differences in history, socio-cultural factors andinstitutional design. This is indicative of the fact that even regions that appear to differsubstantially on the inherent values of the embryo may converge on a similar approach topatenting as the result of differing institutional pressures. In the EU, the approach has beenformed as the result of participatory deliberation involving different stakeholders bothaligned in favour and against hESC-related patents. In China, in comparison, a similarresult has been achieved through elite policy-making decisions designed to facilitateresearch internally while encouraging human and capital investment externally throughsignalling compliance with international best practices. For this reason, the ‘paradox’ ofthe ‘low moral status embryo’ being afforded high moral status in the patenting regimemay not be so paradoxical.
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